By Col. Sanjay Julka , CEO (Technical) AR Airways Pvt. Ltd. In the relentless pursuit of expanding India’s aviation sector—marked by the induction of hundreds of aircraft across commercial, regional, training, and private fleets—experience emerges not as a luxury, but as an indispensable pillar of safety and sustainability. History unequivocally demonstrates that unchecked rapid growth, devoid of robust experience management, precipitates spikes in accidents. This pattern is evident in the alarming tally of incidents over the past nine months in the Non-Scheduled Operators’ Permit (NSOP) and private aviation segments, encompassing both rotary (helicopter) and fixed-wing operations. Indeed, even as this article was being written on the night of February 23, 2026 — hours after the Beechcraft C90 air ambulance crash in Jharkhand — a Pawan Hans helicopter crash-landed in the Andaman Sea the very next morning, as if to validate every word that follows. While infrastructure, assets, and even pilot training programs can be scaled swiftly through investments and inductions, human expertise—the nuanced judgment honed over years of handling diverse scenarios, weather anomalies, mechanical intricacies, and high-stakes decision-making—cannot be manufactured or accelerated. Artificial intelligence, for all its advancements, cannot fully substitute for it, as it lacks the contextual intuition and instinctive risk assessment born from real-world trials and errors. The current fragmentation in the NSOP sector exacerbates these risks. With approximately 490 aircraft scattered across 125 NSOPs—many operating just one or two planes and those with more numbers, often found juggling up to four different aircraft types—supervisory focus is diluted, regulatory oversight is stretched thin, and collective institutional experience is fragmented. This demands an impractical army of inspectors to handle 125 sets of accountable post-holders, surveillance audits, and regulatory audits. Consolidating operations—say, into 50 stronger entities (NSOPs) with a minimum of five aircraft each—would relieve pressure on regulators, pool expertise, and enhance supervision. Scheduled airlines already require a minimum of five aircraft within one year of certification; applying a similar threshold to NSOPs, along with capping aircraft types at four per operator to foster specialization, would consolidate experience where it matters most. Operating more than four aircraft types fritters away and dilutes crew experience — because pilots, engineers, and supervisors must spread their proficiency across too many type-specific procedures, checklists, performance envelopes, and maintenance regimes, preventing the deep specialization that builds genuine mastery and sound judgment. Each additional type also multiplies supervisory burden, requiring separate training syllabi, maintenance programmes, and dedicated check airmen—inevitably thinning oversight and widening the gaps where critical lapses occur. The result is a workforce that is broadly familiar with many types but deeply expert in none—a dangerous condition when split-second decisions and type-specific knowledge are what stand between a safe outcome and a fatal one. Crucially, India should permit Aircraft Management Companies—a globally accepted model inexplicably barred here. This would allow consolidated operations of third-party-owned aircraft under fewer, more experienced entities, streamlining oversight and reducing accident risks. A Year of Alarming Accidents (February 2025–February 2026) The past year has seen a troubling series of accidents, particularly in private, charter, training, and helicopter operations: February 24,2026* (the morning after this article was written)*: A Pawan Hans helicopter crash-landed in the Andaman Sea near Mayabunder shortly after taking off from Port Blair. All 7 onboard (2 crew,5 passengers) survived. The incident underscores, with chilling immediacy, the very warnings articulated in this article—that India’s rotary-wing and NSOP sectors remain acutely vulnerable. February 23,2026: A Beechcraft C90 air ambulance(VT-AJV) operated by Red Bird Airways crashed shortly after takeoff from Ranchi en route to Delhi in Jharkhand’s Chatra district. Seven on board (two pilots, patient, attendants, doctor, and paramedic); fatalities and injuries reported investigation ongoing. February 7, 2026: Indian Air Force Tejas light combat jet crashed during a routine training sortie at a front line base due to suspected brake/onboard systems failure. Pilot ejected safely; aircraft severely damaged. This was the third Tejas incident in recent years (following March 2024 near Jaisalmer and November 2025 Dubai Airshow fatal crash), leading to fleet grounding for inspections. January 28, 2026: Learjet 45 (VSR Ventures) crashed during landing near Baramati, Maharashtra, killing Maharashtra Deputy CM Ajit Pawar and four others. Triggered DGCA audits of NSOPs and uncontrolled airfields. January 10, 2026: India One Air Flight 102 (Cessna 208) forced landing near Rourkela; 1 fatality, 5 survivors. June 15,2025: Bell 407 helicopter (Aryan Aviation) crashed in Kedarnath valley, Uttarakhand, killing all 7 onboard during Char Dham Yatra pilgrimage. June 12,2025: Air India Flight 171 (Boeing787-8 Dreamliner) crashed shortly after takeoff from Ahmedabad into a medical college hostel, killing 241 onboard and 19 on ground(total 260 fatalities).Deadliest in decades; first fatal 787 hull loss. May-June 2025: Multiple helicopter crashes in Uttarakhand’s Char Dham route (at least 5 reported, including May 8 and June15 incidents killing 6 and 7 respectively). Other 2025 incidents: Trainee aircraft crashes (e.g., March 31 Cessna1 52 in Mehsana, April 22 Teena 2008JC in Amreli), helicopter mishaps (April 22 Gujarat, etc.), contributing to 8 major accidents killing 274 by mid-2025. These incidents—many in NSOP/private/charter/helicopter sectors—highlight dilution of oversight in fragmented operations. Why Experience Management Matters: A Visual Illustration The Supervisory Burden of 125 Fragmented NSOPs Company-Level Supervisors (per NSOP) Accountable Manager Quality Manager Safety Manager Continuous Airworthiness Manager Director of Flight Operations Director of Training Director of Maintenance (×125 NSOPs=875+supervisory post-holders) DGCA Oversight Required Flight operations Inspector Airworthiness Inspectors Flight Safety Inspectors (125 NSOPs=125 surveillance audits+125 regulatory audits = Inspector overload) Consolidating 125 NSOPs into 50 stronger entities (min. 5 aircraft each) would reduce company-level post holders by 60 % and cut DGCA audit load proportionally — freeing inspectors to conduct deeper, more effective oversight. (i) Consolidated NSOPs+ Management Companies (ii) Pooled Experience (iii) Safer Operations Rapid inductions add aircraft but not seasoned judgment overnight. Without reforms ,the boom risks tragic headlines. To forge a long-term solution, experience must be actively managed through regulatory changes: minimum five aircraft per NSOP, type limits at four, and enabling Aircraft Management Companies. Such consolidation would streamline oversight, pool expertise in fewer stronger organizations, and ensure
