Satirical title of this write-up is an obvious intended inference. The wide perception that flight under VFR is easy even by a few pilots is intriguing. Minimal institutional assistance extended to VFR flying validates the argument. Lengthening list of repeated CFIT cases however sufficiently and accurately establishes fallacy of ‘Easy VFR’ conjecture. By Capt Peeush Kumar Visual Flight Rules (VFR) defines boundaries of operation through meteorological conditions of visibility and cloud, ambient light, speeds and altitudes. Compliance to rules is legally binding and facilitates safe aircraft control and navigation solely by visual cues. Unlike for flights under IFR (Instrument Flying Rules), the aviation ecosystem effectively relies on one/two minds working under VFR for responsibilities of traffic, weather and terrain avoidance. Systemic support to aircrafts under IFR on the other hand, is a collective effort by pilots, air traffic controllers and technology. Helicopters under VFR do not enjoy aforesaid institutionalised support. In this perspective, helicopter operations under VFR are outliers. Operations under IFR and under VFR are mutually exclusive; only one could be present. Flying under VFR in IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) is both unsafe and illegal. Regulators cannot have monitoring capabilities to enforce this real-world paradox outweighed by commercial imperatives. Stakes for a pilot are intense in the emerging complex picture. In context of business strategy, end-user impression is a potent element to augment or strangulate a service. Connecting dots adequately populate Indian Helicopter industry’s picture. Unfortunate fatal accident (Dec 2021) involving India’s first CDS (Chief of Defence Staff), offshore CFIT case of S-76D helicopter (Jun 2022) operated by ‘Pawan Hans Limited’, and Kedarnath area helicopter crash of Oct 2022 have influenced potential commuters in an undesirable way. Challenges of VFR Flying Flying under VFR is tricky. It involves all of pilots’ skill, awareness, decision-making capabilities and preparation to complete a flight safely. VFR flying is indeed simpler for spatial orientation and visual navigation provided VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) exists. Real world albeit seldom offers this and puts to test a pilots’ skillsets and foresight.Weather consequent collisions with terrain/water/obstacles by airworthy helicopters is an endorsement of perpetual precarious zones under VFR.Single-pilot operations under VFR have additional latent fatigue factor routinely balanced with commercial obligations. Fatigue can contribute to errors of channelised attention, poor judgement, slowed reaction time, inattention and ease of distractions. Nevertheless, this discussion is about making most of available resources, training and environmental offerings to keep safe and help business. Business does not necessarily relate to civil flights here, rather is indicative of deliverables in military realm wherever relevant.The idea of growth relates to confidence and reliability perceived by commuters.Indian helicopter industry has an imposing percentage of armed forces veteran pilots with substantial flight experience under VFR. Learnings from military flying are in ‘Gold’ but need perpetual polishing and adaptations to stay relevant. Flight preparation with considerations of airspace, fuel, PNR (Point of No Return), in-flight decision points and ‘abort’ thresholds play pivotal role for safety. Acceptance that merely something is visible outside cockpit does not mean VMC and remains fundamental to safety under VFR. Either way, being in clouds without sight of surface isn’t the sole definition of IMC. VMC is the minimum regulatory mandate to control an aircraft via visual references.Reduced visibility when below minimum VMC even when in sight of ground is IMC. Responsibility of VFR compliance effectively lands solely on pilots. Two factors must be at the helm of pilots’ decision-making– Pilots’ individual boundaries and Helicopter’s operational envelope. Respect both. Class ‘G’ Airspace A reasonable percentage of helicopter related CFIT cases occur in Class ‘G’ airspace where most helicopter operators earn revenue. Unfortunately, a reliable,relevant weather picture or forecast isn’t available in this airspace in India. ‘Flight information’ services if available, are rare and ‘Flight Following’ service non-existent.Regulations (AIP India – ENR 1.2) mandate flights under VFR in Class ‘G’ airspace to remain clear of clouds, with surface in sight or maintain 1500 m horizontal and 300m vertical separation from clouds depending on altitude. Five (05) km visibility criteria below 10,000 ft altitude are regulated. In absence of weather-related inputs,cloud avoidance is a reactionary procedure for pilots riddled with high upset probability. Unless sparsely present, cloud avoidance tests experience and luck of pilots to keep ‘return back/abort’ option open.Else, ensuing precautionary landings are a saviour and have been encouraged by DGCA vide Air Safety Circular 09/2013. Related to cloud separation, consider distance estimation when stationary on a known land mass.It would be convenient to use available landmarks as ‘scale/graduations’ for a reasonable distance estimate. These critical reference points are however absent when estimating clearance from clouds in flight. Obscurity with moving clouds demand challenging distance estimation skills from pilots. Unpleasant,large errors can quickly put them in a spot. Cloud edges help but would be missing when needed. ‘Vanishing landmarks’ are late indicators of deteriorating in-flight visibility, albeit still helpful to invoke alternate/contingency plans. Misjudging inter-se distance from clouds or encountering embedded clouds in fog is a UIMC (Unintended IMC) hazard and catastrophic if covering terrain. If practical, maintain maximum clearance and trigger ‘return back/abort’ procedures when approaching a pre-decided criterion. Speed reduction is helpful to gain response/manoeuvring time. Visibility dropping situations must be anticipated and mitigated with pre-decided thresholds. If a risk assessed escape plan is not duplicated during flight, cockpit discomfort may quickly rise to dangerous levels. In a multi-crew cockpit, contingency plan must be briefed pre-flight. Operational and commercial pressures converge solely on pilots. Victimisation, if called out by pilots shall be an excuse and must be avoided. Professional maturity and experience should assista balanced decision-making process. Poor aeronautical decisions and intentional disregard to regulations have serious consequences. Pilots must factor that any in-flight irrecoverable situation would endanger lives of most aircraft occupants. Deliberating post-flight on portion(s) of flight that raised cockpit discomfort, and remedial measures thereof is a healthy practice at local levels. Mitigating hazards of weather, terrain and operational pressures are institutional compulsions for safety while maintaining relevance to commercial priorities. For start, Indian ANSP (Air Navigation Service Provider
